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Introduction: the ‘great danger’ of populism 
Populism has often been described as the ultimate threat for Europe. In fact, it is not 
very long since the former EU President, Herman van Rompuy called populism ‘the 
greatest danger for Europe’ (FAZ, 9 April 2010). In a similar tone, Jean-Claude 
Juncker recently issued a warning that the EU is in a battle with ‘galloping populism’ 
(Times, 14 September 2016). What about the media? Populism ‘is a real threat to 
mainstream democracy,’ noted Anthony Painter in the New Statesman (22 March 
2013). ‘Populism is tearing Europe apart,’ read the editorial of La Razón, right after 
the British referendum (25 June 2016). ‘The populists are on the loose, […] dragging 
Western Europe towards its downfall,’ stressed Der Spiegel around the same days (26 
June 2016). Similar headlines and statements appear very often in newspapers across 
Europe. And while academics usually adopt more ‘neutral’ approaches to the 
phenomenon, avoiding axiological readings and moralist denunciations, it is not rare 
to encounter renowned researchers that are a priori dismissive of populism, 
interpreting it as a fundamentally anti-pluralist and anti-democratic phenomenon, an 
imminent danger to be dealt with.1 
 
My aim in this article is to offer a brief yet comprehensive overview of the relevant 
discussion in a bid to problematize the supposed ‘imminent threat’ of populism in 
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light of recent developments within the political systems and societies of established 
democracies, especially under conditions of economic and political crisis. 
 
Populists on the rise, then and now 
During the recent years of crisis and austerity there has been a significant rise of 
populist parties in Europe, with some of them winning elections and disturbing 
previously established hegemonies, causing significant realignments and thus 
changing the rules of the (political) game. The same can be said for the US, where we 
have seen both populist social movements and politicians rise to prominence, posing 
serious challenges to the established political elites. In this sense, the ‘alarming’ 
populist challenge, that is so often discussed in the public sphere, has a ‘real’ concrete 
base, as populists of various shapes and colours are indeed gaining ground in Europe 
and across the world. Interestingly, this ‘populist surge’ has brought renewed intensity 
to the debate around the crisis of democracy itself and the capacity of existing 
institutions to express and empower citizens, upholding democracy’s promise for 
popular sovereignty (‘power to the people!’). If the people are turning to populist 
challengers and outsiders, who seem overly radical, or even ‘extremist,’ then 
something must be wrong with our democratic-representational systems; something is 
not working in the representational bond and relation between the governed and the 
governors, common citizens and the political elites. This, at least, seems to be a 
common suggestion on the lips of politicians, pundits and academics. 
 
On the other hand, to put things in perspective, one might say that this discussion is 
not particularly new. Europe has found itself debating the supposedly overwhelming 
and unstoppable ‘rise of populism’ many times within the past decades, especially 
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since the mid-1980s and the first electoral breakthrough of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the 
Front National (FN), in France.2 During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the so-called 
‘populist radical right’ had its first pan-European breakthrough, with figures like Jörg 
Haider, Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, and others, joining the spotlight.3 And there are 
numerous other examples of more or less known (alleged) populists that have made 
significant electoral gains around the same period.  
 
Today, the various populists at the Right of the political spectrum appear to have 
consolidated their position. The ‘renewed’ FN under Marine Le Pen poses as a viable 
contender of power in France, the Finns Party in Finland are participating in a 
coalition government, holding significant cabinets, the Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) 
candidate, Norbert Hofer was only narrowly defeated in the Austrian presidential 
election of April 2016 and appears very likely to win in the re-run of the election (in 
December 2016), while Fidesz and Viktor Orbán’s hegemony in Hungary seems 
rather unchallenged. One might add the victory of the ‘Exit’ camp in the British 
referendum, where right-wing (populist) politicians like Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson 
and Michael Gove played a key role, but also the significant gains of the Alternative 
for Germany (AfD) as reflected in the result of recent local elections in Germany. 
 
But it is no longer just the rightist populists that are doing well. Under the shadow of 
the ‘Great Recession,’ the picture has evolved and we have now witnessed a new 
surge, which is characterised by the emergence of populist parties that belong to the 
Left or the Radical Left. The austerity-hit European periphery, and especially the 
South, has been at the forefront of this new trend. Political parties like SYRIZA in 
Greece and Podemos in Spain4 rode the waves of massive grassroots anti-austerity 
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movements and significantly expanded their electoral support, triggering major 
political re-alignments in their countries and sending shivers throughout Europe. 
SYRIZA is now nearing two years in government (having won two general elections 
and a referendum after January 2015), while Podemos participated in intense 
negotiations to support a government under the Socialists after the national election of 
December 2015, and has since been established as a major player in the Spanish 
political system. 
 
In this context, various populist forces have entered government across Europe, or 
appear as viable contenders of power, while others have established themselves as the 
main opposition or have managed to win referendums. In other words, they are 
political actors to be taken seriously, and can no longer be seen as just ‘flash parties,’ 
or ‘episodic’ phenomena that will soon disappear, leaving ‘mainstream’ parties in 
peace. But is this good or bad for democracy? And what are the prospects of populism 
from now on, in a Europe that has found itself entangled in yet another major crisis, 
the refugee crisis, and along with it new national isolationisms and rising xenophobia? 
 
What is populism? 
To start dealing with such questions we first have to offer a brief yet comprehensive 
definition of populism. I’ll draw here on the emerging consensus around discursive or 
‘ideational’ approaches to the phenomenon, in order to stress some key characteristics 
on which most scholars seem to agree on.5 
 
First of all, populism seems to always entail the discursive construction and 
interpellation of ‘the people’ as a collective subject and key actor of social change. 
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‘The people,’ in its various names and guises (‘the many,’ the ‘non-privileged,’ ‘the 
99%’) are called upon as the only ones that can legitimise democratic decision 
making; as the subject of social change and radical subversion; the ones that, in the 
final instance, legitimise democratic polity itself. This central position of ‘the people’ 
alone, however, is not enough, as most democratic discourses of modern times 
involve calls upon the people. The populists just seem to be more vocal and 
emotionally intense about it. 
 
The second key characteristic of populism is its sharp antagonistic worldview: the 
representation of society as ultimately divided between ‘the people’ and the 
‘establishment’ (the ‘underdog’ vs. the ‘elite,’ the marginalised many vs. the 
privileged few). Populists are placed on the side of ‘the people,’ pledging to serve the 
popular will and reinforce popular sovereignty, accountability and participation, 
making the political process more open and accountable to popular demands and 
grievances against power holders and ‘oligarchs.’ 
 
These two are the core elements of populism that one finds in most scholarly works, 
like the one of Ernesto Laclau, who has offered one of the most prominent 
theorizations of populism already from the late 1970s,6 but also in the work of most 
discourse-oriented scholars.7 Laclau understands populism as a specific type of 
political discourse, a ‘logic’ which attributes to ‘the people’ a protagonist position, 
while challenging at the same time a given power structure. He has thus stressed both 
the centrality of antagonism in this specific way of doing politics, as well as the role 
of representation; invocations of the people as well as the construction of antagonistic 
schemas manifest primarily on the discursive/symbolic level. Laclau has also stressed 
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that the concepts ‘people’ and ‘establishment’ are empty signifiers, which means that 
they can take on different meanings depending on the speaker and the context in 
which they are articulated. 
 
In this sense, populist movements and parties call upon various groups of individuals 
in order to link and mobilise them against a perceived ‘enemy’ that is somehow 
opposing their well-being, undermining their economic and social status, or even 
threatening their existence. This formal understanding of populism gives us a precise 
illustration of its political logic – the way in which it typically operates, articulating 
various discursive elements toward forming a political message and strategy –, which 
is useful in identifying populist actors, but it does not tell us much regarding the 
content of populist politics; its ideological, economic, cultural, institutional, or other 
aspects. 
 
From populism’s form to populism’s content 
Indeed, populism’s contents may significantly vary, depending on the ideology to 
which it is attached, as well as the socio-economic and historical environment in 
which it emerges and develops. This explains the fact that we have historically 
witnessed so many different forms of populist articulations: populisms that favoured 
statist economic programmes (Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, PASOK in the 1970s-
1980s Greece) and others that were free-market oriented (Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 
the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties); populisms that emerged from the 
grassroots (the Populist movement in the US of the late 19th century,  the Spanish 
indignados) and populisms that were concentrated on charismatic leaders and strict 
top-down hierarchies (Juan Perón in Argentina, the Le Pens in France), populisms that 
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articulated demands for democratic expansion and social inclusion (Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Podemos in Spain) and populisms that defended authoritarian logics and 
social or ethnic exclusion (Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the FPÖ in Austria); we have 
also witnesses populisms that led waves of democratisation to gradually lean towards 
authoritarian paths (Rafael Correa in Ecuador). This highlights not only the 
‘chameleonic’ nature and malleability of populism,8 but also the fact that it is 
practically impossible and methodologically wrong to adopt a firm axiological 
position vis-à-vis populism tout court, as if it were something good or bad, 
reactionary or progressive, democratic or anti-democratic. Whether we like it or not, it 
has been and it can be all of that, depending on the actor that incarnates it and the 
context in which it manifests. 
 
Therefore, developing a critical and informed opinion regarding ‘actually existing’ 
populist movements and parties is absolutely necessary. And there are indeed ways in 
which we can approach such phenomena, starting with the way in which the populist 
discursive ‘form’ is filled with various (ideological, programmatic, cultural, moral, 
etc.) ‘contents.’ 
 
In practice, the way in which populists (and non-populist actors) speak about ‘the 
people,’ can significantly vary, as others consider the people to be a mono-ethnic 
community bound by relations of common culture, language or blood, and others 
might see it as a political community, plural and heterogeneous, bound only by a 
sense of common fate and commitment to a shared set of values. Moreover, the way 
in which the antagonism itself with the ‘enemy’ is signified, can also acquire different 
contents and directions: in some cases, an unresponsive ‘elite’ can be blamed for its 
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economic injustices and corruption, or it can be castigated for nurturing hidden plans 
and conspiracies of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ allowing invading ‘others’ to ‘take over’ the 
country, in others. 
 
Such contingent ideological articulations, once crystallised, will determine the 
specific character of a given populist mobilisation and thus its significance for the 
development of a democratic society. In a nutshell: It is not the same rallying a plural 
people around demands for equal social and political rights and against an 
unresponsive political elite, with rallying an ethnically ‘pure’ people against its 
cultural/ethnic ‘others’ (immigrants) and around demands that put ‘natives’ first. 
Thus, it is only after we scrutinise and carefully assess each case (its ideology, 
historicity, etc.) that we can develop a critical position that is meaningful and 
productive in terms of scientific inquiry and also democratic debate. And it is exactly 
the task of contemporary social scientists to develop such theoretically informed and 
cautious empirical analyses of populist experiences, following the example of recent 
works that illustrate both theoretical depth and broad comparative scope.9 
 
Left-wing vs. right-wing populisms 
It should have become clear then, up to this point, that it is exactly the specific 
ideology behind targeting an ‘elite’ and calling upon a ‘people’ that defines a populist 
movement’s essence and orientation. 
 
Let me make this rather normative position more concrete and empirically grounded, 
by focusing on the way in which ‘the people’ is constructed within the context of left-
wing populist discourses in today’s Europe. The two most prominent such examples, 
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despite their differences, are the ones of SYRIZA and Podemos. Those parties 
construct ‘the people’ as a pluralist and heterogeneous collective subject that can 
include different social classes, ethnicities, religions and sexual orientations, while 
they also emphasise the need to re-incorporate and represent the marginalised, the 
lower-classes or excluded sectors of society. In this sense, left-wing populism in 
today’s Europe seems more egalitarian and inclusionary, building its public appeal 
around issues that concern the socio-economic sphere. As such, it is similar to the 
Latin American populist-left experience, as exemplified by leaders like Evo Morales, 
whom has focused a lot on giving voice to the marginalised or excluded sectors of 
society. 
 
Now, if we move towards the Right of the political spectrum, we will find a quite 
different conception of ‘the people.’ For example, the FN in France, or the FPÖ in 
Austria, as well as other populist radical right parties, all seem to favour a strictly 
ethnic (even racial) understanding of the people, portrayed as a homogeneous organic 
community, opposing at the same time minorities (religious, ethnic, etc.), and 
expressing xenophobic, racist or homophobic views. In this sense, such parties tend to 
be exclusionary and regressive, connecting the well-being of the ‘native’ people to the 
exclusion of alien ‘others’ and with the restriction of the latter’s rights and freedoms. 
 
Such diverging conceptions of the collective subject and of its ‘enemy’ can have 
serious policy implications. Take for example the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe 
and the different ways in which populist leaders have dealt with it. Maybe the most 
telling contradiction is the one between Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. The first one has repeatedly stressed the 
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need to express solidarity towards the refugees and immigrants, and to welcome them 
in European societies, while the later has done everything in his capacity to exclude 
refugees and immigrants, portraying them as threats and potential enemies, as agents 
of ‘islamisation’ and ‘a danger to the Christian traditions of Europe.’ This is not mere 
rhetoric, since the former’s stance is connected to tolerance and integration within a 
pluralist society, while the latter’s nurtures nationalism, chauvinism and exclusion. 
 
It should also seem rather obvious that significant differences can be traced in the 
ways in which the various populists construct the image of the ‘enemy.’ Again, in 
discourses such as the ones of Podemos, the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) and other 
leftist populist parties, the ‘establishment’ that is attacked is mostly defined in socio-
economic terms, as a nexus of neoliberal political, economic and media elites, both 
domestic and international, that favour the interests of the ‘few’ against the interests 
of the ‘many.’ Moving to the right, we see that in the case of the FN or the Dutch 
Party for Freedom (PVV) and others, the ‘elites’ (sometimes depicted as ‘puppets of 
the EU superstate’) are considered primarily as guilty for letting ‘foreigners’ take over 
the country, as irresponsible in not protecting the homogeneity and security of the 
nation, or even for actively conspiring against it. Thus divisions here are not so much 
understood in socio-economic terms (although such an agenda is all the more 
emphasised in the discourse of the FN), but more in cultural and ethnic terms, 
attacking vulnerable ‘others’ and minorities that are being targeted for their religion, 
ethnic origin or sexual orientation. 
 
Lastly, it is crucial to stress that the ongoing research has observed that inclusive, 
egalitarian and/or pluralist populist parties and initiatives (usually left-leaning) tend to 
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be more internationalist and generally rather positive regarding European integration 
(despite often criticizing the EU in its current form), whereas exclusive and 
identitarian ones (usually right-leaning) seem to advocate a ‘Europe of strong nation 
states,’ or even dismiss the very idea of European integration in general, moving from 
euro-scepticism to a firm anti-European position. 
 
Identity formation, incorporation, representation 
In this context, I believe that it is wrong – methodologically and politically – to 
denounce populism tout court as a pathological and anti-democratic form of politics. 
Indeed, it might be better to understand it as a way – among many others – to appeal 
to groups of people, even to national audiences, in order to mobilise them against 
named opponents and at the same time a way to offer some kind of incorporation. 
Now, this second aspect has not been investigated as much as it should and it needs 
clarification and discussion. 
 
This populist incorporation can be exclusive and identitarian (‘you’re one of us, as 
long as we share the same ethnic origins’), or it can be an inclusive and pluralist one 
(‘you’re one of us regardless ethnicity, religion, etc., as long as we stand together 
against the neoliberal elite’). Admittedly, this is a rather simplified representation of 
possible articulations, based on the two broader categories of populism that seem to 
crystallise in Europe, while it is still possible to encounter ‘hybrid’ cases, that escape 
the classifications left/right, inclusive/exclusive, monist/pluralist. Such is probably the 
case of Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy. It is not a coincidence that 
commentators and analysts have struggled with classifying the M5S on the left-right 
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axis, while Grillo himself has famously stated that his party in neither left nor right, 
but ‘proudly populist’. 
 
The M5S, which rose as part of widespread anti-austerity and anti-establishment 
protest in the Italy of 2009, has put forth demands for direct and participatory 
democracy and expanded forms of welfare, focusing on a basic guaranteed income, 
while taking a firm stance against political corruption. It has also put high in its 
agenda a series of environmental issues. In this context, it seems to present affinities 
with left-wing and progressive populisms in Europe and beyond. However, the M5S 
has established an overwhelmingly personalistic leadership and a centralized 
structure, leaving little room for internal democracy, transparency and accountability, 
while it has often criticised trade unions (especially the left-oriented ones). Moreover, 
the party has sparked controversy when joining the Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy political group in the European Parliament, which is led by the hard-
Eurosceptic and nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP). Lastly, Grillo himself 
has provoked outrage with racist or even anti-Semitic comments, leading some 
commentators to place him more on the right of the political spectrum. The M5S is 
not the only ‘hybrid’ populist case worth lingering on, but it is surely one of the most 
interesting and analytically challenging ones among the emergent populist parties and 
it is very telling regarding the ambiguities and paradoxes that penetrate the populist 
phenomenon in general. 
 
In any case, the function of incorporation, in its various forms, tells us something 
crucial regarding the conditions of emergence and probable success of a populist 
project. As many theorists have stressed, populism needs some notion of ‘crisis’ to 
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flourish. But ‘crisis’ is too vague of a concept to capture the specificity of a socio-
political environment which favours populist actors. In this respect, Kenneth Roberts 
has rightly re-situated the discussion on the plane of political representation, linking 
populist ruptures to specific types of crisis of representation.10 One of the scenarios of 
such crises, that he suggests, is the situation where a political system is characterised 
by lack of responsiveness or accountability. In this case, while democratic institutions 
formally work, the rule of law is respected, liberties are secured and parties can freely 
compete in elections, citizens are left with a feeling of lacking alternatives or of not 
being heard.  
 
This is due to the fact that – as we have seen in many European countries – 
mainstream parties that dominate the political scene have programmatically 
converged to such an extent, that it does not really make a difference to vote for one 
or the other. The ‘grand coalitions’ in Germany, the ‘Proporz’ system in Austria, as 
well as the technocratic governments of Papademos and Monti, in Greece and Italy, 
provide good examples of such systems of ‘post-political consensus’ – or even ‘forced 
consensus’ –, systems that look rather ‘postdemocratic’ than actually democratic.11 
What is more, citizens in Europe have often witnessed the imposition of policies 
sharply opposed to their mandate, due to external pressures and constraints or even 
political blackmail. Such is the case, one might say, of the Greek referendum of July 
2015 where, despite the people’s clear decision to reject a new bailout deal premised 
on further austerity, such a deal was imposed to the Greek government under the 
threat of a complete economic collapse and international isolation. One might 
cynically note here that the EU has a long tradition in ignoring or ‘overcoming’ 
referenda decisions that go against the hegemonic agenda, if one recalls what 
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happened with French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution in 2005, or 
with the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon on 2008-2009. On top of everything 
else, voters’ disaffection with the established political system has been strengthened 
by numerous corruption scandals involving the traditional parties in many countries of 
Europe (e.g. Italy, Greece and Spain). 
 
In such a context, where citizen feel misrepresented or not represented at all, where 
there are serious doubts about the moral integrity of the political elite and the policies 
being implemented have little to do with the popular vote, populist politicians and 
parties can claim to better understand and express the marginalised, frustrated or even 
infuriated people, against a political system that has become self-serving, 
unresponsive and alienated. At the same time, discontent can be directly expressed 
from below, through populist social movements that re-claim ‘power to the people,’ 
creating the conditions where ‘populism in the streets’ can meet with ‘populism in the 
parliament.’ It is not a coincidence that recent social movements against austerity in 
Spain and Greece rallied around the slogan ‘you do not represent us’ (addressed to 
traditional parties) and demanded ‘true democracy now!’. Crucially, such movements 
soon found their institutional expression in the party system (indignados in Podemos, 
aganaktismenoi in SYRIZA, but also Occupy in a series of political figures in the 
Democrats, but most notably in Bernie Sanders). 
 
Concluding remarks 
Given the widespread feeling that we have entered a critical juncture for democratic 
institutions, one cannot help but ask: what lies ahead for European and Western 
democracies? What are the consequences and prospects of populism in today’s 
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democratic systems? Since populism can appear in varying and contradictory guises, 
as illustrated above, it is rather hard, maybe impossible to offer a general answer. A 
rather obvious consequence of populism, though, is the introduction of a more 
adversarial and confrontational style in the political scene, but this is rather an 
intrinsic trait of politics itself, and as long as confrontation is not taking violent forms, 
it cannot be regarded as harmful. In fact, bringing back political confrontation might 
be a good antidote to the alienation that has been nurtured by post-political consensus; 
by the widespread sense that all parties are the same, that ideologies and programmes 
do not matter and that elections rarely make any difference. 
 
Instead of trying to grasp populism’s probable consequences, there might be a more 
important lesson to draw from the success of populist parties and movements and this 
has to do with the quality of representation itself, as well as the responsiveness of 
political actors and institutions, bringing into the picture the issues of popular 
accountability and direct participation. 
 
This is particularly important in today’s Europe, where mainstream political forces of 
centre-left and centre-right seem to have lost their links with civil society, becoming 
all the more attached to the administrational workings of the state; what the renowned 
political scientist Peter Mair has described as the ‘cartelisation’ of political parties, 
which has spread to the EU itself, making it a remote ‘protected sphere,’ unaware of 
people’s agonies and grievances.12 In one way or another, populist parties are gaining 
ground against such ‘cartel’ systems around Europe, and they are doing so not only in 
cases where economic hardship has hit hard, but also in cases where the economy has 
performed rather well and institutions are stable and efficient. 
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In the South, the populist Left has found a favourable environment to put forth 
demands against austerity, rising inequality and impoverishment, in favour of re-
including the marginalised social strata. In the North, the populist Right has managed 
to attract voters that were frustrated with mainstream parties, channelling social 
anxieties through identity issues, stressing the need to return to strong nation-states 
that provide welfare to ‘their own.’ In most cases, it would be impossible for such 
parties to succeed, if this ‘gap of representation’ wasn’t there for them to fill; if a 
latent crisis of representation hadn’t already challenged existing identities, political 
commitments and established social compromises. 
 
To sum up, any discussion regarding the ‘populist challenge’ for today’s Europe and 
Western democracies in general cannot be productive if we don’t take into account 
the inherent ambiguity of the phenomenon: both threat and corrective, both fulfilling a 
democratising promise and susceptible to authoritarian turns, both progressive and 
regressive. The a priori demonization of populism that ignores its specific content and 
message, is doomed to backfire, since along with dismissing the populist ‘devils,’ one 
risks dismissing ‘the people’ themselves, their worries, frustrations and grievances. 
Unfortunately, this is the path that has too often been chosen by mainstream political 
forces and intellectuals around Europe, quite characteristically in France, leading to a 
paradoxical self-fulfilling prophecy: by denouncing any opposition to the mainstream, 
by dismissing any critique to the ‘moderate’ forces as ‘dangerous populism,’ its 
leadership has been feeding anti-establishment actors which now take a firm 
reactionary stance and seem more powerful than ever. Marine Le Pen’s performance 
in recent elections is a bitter reminder of such a dynamic. 
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What is worse, being unable to distinguish between populists of different kinds and 
orientations, this kind of mainstream ‘anti-populist’ discourse has often lumped 
together extremely different political actors (e.g. Podemos with the FN), failing to 
establish ideologico-political exchanges that could be productive both for 
democracies on the national level and also for the development and further 
democratisation of the EU itself. Crucially, and very tellingly, European elites have 
appeared more willing to tolerate forces on the right, like Orbán, who is alarmingly 
anti-liberal and authoritarian, than others on the left, as exemplified by the brutal 
stance of European elites against the SYRIZA-led government. Moreover, traditional 
parties around Europe have accompanied their public critique against ‘populists’ with 
the actual endorsement of policies advocated by the populist extreme-right, as it is the 
case, again, in France, where both the centre-right and the centre-left have adopted 
elements of the FN’s discourse and policies on immigration and security. 
 
However, risky and heretical as it may sound, mainstream parties ought to take 
seriously the demands of populists on the various issues which they raise, from 
participatory democracy to transparency, and from wealth distribution and social 
protection to popular accountability. And they do not just have to take them into 
account, but they ought to respond to them with concrete policy proposals and with 
discourses that can aspire positive passions of hope among the citizens that struggle in 
conditions of stagnation and generalised impasse. After all, this is the main reason 
why populists are so successful: they represent certain salient societal issues against 
which traditional parties have remained unresponsive or even hostile. 
 
Article published in The Political Quarterly, 88(2), 2017, pp. 202-210, DOI: 10.1111/1467-
923X.12317. 
18 
 
The coming months will probably provide even more occasions to further reflect on 
the relation between unresponsive elites implementing unpopular policies and the rise 
of populist challengers. If my analysis has some validity, then I wouldn’t be surprised 
to see populist actors doing well in forthcoming elections in countries like France, 
Austria and Germany. The crucial issue though has to do with the kind of demands 
that such populists will put forth. My suspicion is that, after crushing a left-wing 
alternative (namely SYRIZA), EU’s key political actors have created an environment 
more conductive to the rise of right-wing populism. But that, of course, is rather 
speculation. We will have to wait and see. 
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